








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Drogendijk, H. J. (2005). The Development of Network Relations of MNC Subsidiaries: How Internal MNC and
External (Local) Relations Evolve. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-128). Organization.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.





















THE DEVELOPMENT OF NETWORK RELATIONS OF MNC 
SUBSIDIARIES: HOW INTERNAL MNC AND EXTERNAL 
(LOCAL) RELATIONS EVOLVE 
 































   
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NETWORK RELATIONS OF MNC SUBSIDIARIES:  



























1Tilburg University, Department of Organization& Strategy; PO Box 90153; 5000 LE; 
Tilburg; tel. +31 13 466 2315; e-mail h.j.drogendijk@uvt.nl 
2Uppsala University, Företagsekonomiska Institutionen; Box 513;751 20 Uppsala; tel. +46 18 




The Development of Network Relations of MNC Subsidiaries: how internal 




Abstract: Managing relations is a complex task for internationalizing firms and their 
subsidiaries: MNC subsidiaries are not only part of the MNC network but they also 
develop relations with network actors in their local environment. This paper 
investigates conceptually how MNC subsidiaries established through generic 
expansion build relations within the MNC and with external market and non-market 
actors as they evolve through stages of start-up, growth and maturity. The paper 
develops propositions, grounded in institutional theory, resource dependency theory 
and network approaches, on the changing strength and importance of a subsidiary’s 
relations depending on its dependence or interdependence in these relations, with five 
groups of actors (MNC headquarters, other subsidiaries within the MNC, local 
business actors, local government and non-government organizations). The paper 
ends with drawing directions for future work that will enhance understanding of the 
dynamics of relationship management in MNC subsidiaries. 
 
JEL code: F23 
Keywords: MNC management; HQ-subsidiary relations; networks; institutional 
theory 
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The Development of Network Relations of MNC Subsidiaries: how internal 






This paper investigates conceptually how subsidiary managers within the 
multinational company (MNC) manage network relations as their subsidiaries mature 
and build their resource position over time. The position of MNC subsidiaries is 
complex because of their dual environment: they have to face the pressures and 
demands coming from diverse institutional forces and network actors in their local 
environment but have to respond to similar pressures coming from the MNC and 
sister subsidiaries to which they are interlinked at the same time (Rosenzweig and 
Singh, 1991; Westney, 1993). Very often, demands coming from these different 
environments will contradict, forcing subsidiaries to balance their responses to all 
actors concerned. Furthermore, demands and pressures from different network actors 
as well as subsidiaries’ reactions to these demands are likely to change over time, 
because of changing environmental circumstances and resource needs of the 
subsidiary in the process of its development from newly established affiliate towards 
mature participant in the MNC.  
This paper takes a subsidiary management point of view in order to analyze 
how the strength of MNC subsidiaries’ relations with different network actors1 varies 
over time, given the changes in pressures from diverse network actors, changing 
dependence upon these actors and changing importance of their contributions to the 
                                                 
1 In order to distinguish between the relationship and the actual entity with which the subsidiary has 
this relationship I use the term ‘actor’ for the entity and ‘relation’ or ‘relationship’ for the exchange and 
interaction between the focal subsidiary and the actor(s). 
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subsidiary’s resource position as it matures. I specifically study the stages in which 
newly established subsidiaries develop their resources and capabilities and build a 
network position both within the MNC as well as in the local environment. I focus on 
generic expansions of MNCs, or greenfield establishments, and ignore acquisitions 
because in contrast to greenfields acquisitions enter the MNC with an already 
developed stock of resources and capabilities. It is therefore more interesting to study 
the processes of resource development and the role of network relations in them in the 
context of greenfield subsidiaries. 
Especially in the early stages of its existence, a subsidiary carefully needs to 
balance its attention to different groups of actors in a broad environment. First it has 
to build those resources and capabilities that will secure survival and then it may wish 
to position itself for further development, eventually aiming to grow into a full-
fledged actor in both the MNC and the external environment. In the scarce literature 
on subsidiary development processes, researchers have described subsidiary 
development as a process of increasing integration (Malnight, 1995), and increasing 
levels of local resources (e.g. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). The most integrated, and 
strategically important subsidiaries are portrayed to possess unique resources, 
resulting in dependency of the MNC on these subsidiaries (Birkinshaw, 1996; 
Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989). Subsidiaries in such positions, having developed a certain 
critical level of resources and capabilities, continuously need to review and renew 
their resources and capabilities in order to remain competitive. The evolution of 
relationships with the internal and external environment co-evolves with the 
accumulation or depletion of resources and capabilities caused by shifts in the 
subsidiary’s charter (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). The analysis in this paper, 
however, is not focused at relationship development in these mature stages of a 
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subsidiary’s lifetime. In contrast, I aim to contribute to our understanding of the early 
stages of subsidiary development and the importance of internal and external network 
relations. This paper therefore aims to fill an important gap in contemporary literature 
on subsidiary development, which so far has ignored the question of how subsidiaries 
develop (unique) resources and capabilities in these early stages (Paterson and Brock, 
2002). 
I build on three bodies of literature to develop a dynamic model of how 
internal and external network relations contribute to the maturing of MNC 
subsidiaries: institutional theory (Scott, 1995; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), resource 
dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and relational and network 
approaches (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995; Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 1999). 
From institutional theory I draw in reasoning that MNC subsidiaries are subject to 
isomorphic pressures (cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) of both the organization they 
are part of as well as the local environment in which they operate (Rosenzweig and 
Singh, 1991). Subsidiaries’ internal relations, with company counterparts, may even 
suffer from strong relations with business actors in the local market (Ghauri, 1990). I 
build on resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) following Jawahar 
and McLaughlin (2001), who developed a conceptual model of the shifting attention 
of firms to those internal and external stakeholders (like creditors, customers, 
suppliers and employees) that they are most dependent on for survival. Network 
theorists, finally, argue that an organization’s network relations are a source of 
competitive advantage because these relationships give the organization access to 
resources beyond its own boundaries (Gulati et al. 2000; Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
Work on the dynamics of networks shows how important it is to build the right 
relationships in order not to be locked out of critical resources (Khanna, Gulati and 
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Nohria, 1998). It adds to the former two theories the idea that subsidiaries are not only 
affected by and dependent upon demands and resources from their environment for 
survival, but also can take the initiative to search access to resources in their 
environment in order to achieve a competitive advantage. Combining the three 
theories allows us to do better justice to the complexity of MNC subsidiaries’ 
environments and develop a more complete understanding of the multitude of actors 
that managers in the maturing MNC subsidiary are confronted with, than analyses 
based on either one of them alone could have.  
 
The complexities of the MNC subsidiary environment 
Though forces of globalization are claimed to lead to cultural and institutional 
convergence, firms entering new markets still suffer from liabilities of foreignness 
(Zaheer, 1995) and the survival or performance of local subsidiaries is negatively 
affected by cultural differences between home and host markets (e.g. Barkema, Bell 
and Pennings, 1996). In order to overcome these liabilities, firms need to learn how to 
operate in the local market, to develop their local network and to gain legitimacy 
(Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). Partly, firms accumulate market information and 
experiential knowledge that allows them to correctly interpret signals on business 
opportunities in their environment through observation and ‘learning by doing’ (cf. 
Penrose, 1995). But, furthermore, firms interact and build relations with local network 
actors in order to exchange resources, including goods or (unfinished) products, 
financial resources, and knowledge and information (Khanna, et al. 1998). These 
resource exchanges happen with market as well as non-market actors and both are 
important for the subsidiary’s current operations and for the creation of future 
business opportunities (Andersson, Forsgren and Holm, 2002; Baron, 1995). Market 
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actors that MNC subsidiaries interact with include suppliers, sub-contractors, 
distributors, customers, and competitors in the host market and in other national 
markets in which the MNC operates (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995). Non-market 
actors are governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in local 
markets and international NGOs as the WTO, who define rules and regulations and as 
such influence the boundaries of the subsidiary’s operations, but also include media, 
public opinion and protest groups that may challenge the operations or the legitimacy 
of the MNC and its subsidiaries (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Baron, 1995; Doh and 
Teegen, 2002).  
The national market in which the MNC establishes a new subsidiary 
constitutes a new environment with new cultural and social values, laws, rules and 
regulations, government institutions and social and business networks, defining the 
boundaries of the subsidiary’s local activities. According to institutional theory, 
organizations adapt to their institutional environment and adopt structures and 
processes used in the environment, even if this impairs the efficiency of operations 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). For MNC subsidiaries, responding to these isomorphic 
pressures of the national environment in which they operate can mean resisting the 
demands put upon them by the MNC organization (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). 
Local laws and regulations may, for example, require the use of training or incentive 
schemes for local personnel even if they contrast with HRM systems used in the 
company (e.g. Whitley, 2003). Local technological conventions could impose the 
subsidiary to adapt products or production processes in order to fit those of local 
suppliers, even if deviations from company-wide used processes make internal 
product and knowledge flows more difficult. Therefore, subsidiaries of multinational 
companies face a challenging task to respond to the demands and access the resources 
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of their internal network counterparts as well as market and non-market actors in the 
external, often national, environment. Figure 1 illustrates the complexity of MNC 
subsidiaries’ environments and their direct relationships with internal and external 
actors. 
 
------Insert Figure 1 about here------ 
 
Dependence and interdependence 
Facing the challenges of its complex environment with the large variety of 
internal and external actors with whom the subsidiary could build a relationship and 
given the limited resources, including time and human resources, that subsidiaries can 
devote to initiating and maintaining network relations, it becomes extremely 
important to develop the right relations at the right time. One way to set priorities in 
relationship building is through reviewing the subsidiary’s critical dependence on 
relevant actors’ resources and capabilities (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). According to 
this reasoning, the more important an actor and its resources are to the success or 
survival of subsidiaries at a certain point in time, the more attention subsidiary 
management should devote to its relationship with this actor (Dyer and Singh, 1998) 
and to its demands or concerns (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001). Resource 
dependence is argued and empirically supported to increase interaction (Levine and 
White, 1961; Oliver, 1990) and to strengthen the network relation (Ghauri, 1990) 
between an organization and the actor on which it is dependent. This suggests a one-
way situation, in which a focal organization is dependent upon certain resources from 
another organization (or group of organizations), resulting in the uneven situation of 
dependence.  
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In other situations, however, the dependency goes in both directions: the focal 
organization and another (group of) organization(s) are dependent upon one another 
for critical resources. In situations of interdependence a more complex system of 
coordination and relationship management evolves (Grandori, 1997) in which both 
sides of the relationship hold an interest and likewise take responsibility relationship 
development and resource exchange. Interdependent relationships between 
organizations are characterized as strong relationships in which much interaction, 
exchange and resource combination takes place (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; 
Blankenburg-Holm, Eriksson and Johanson, 1999). For MNC subsidiaries, 
interdependent relations are found to evolve both with actors within the MNC 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Hedlund, 1986) as well as outside of the MNC 
organization, often in the local national environment (Oliver, 1990; Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1995).  
 
Whether the subsidiary is dependent upon a certain actor, or whether a 
situation of interdependence exists, influences how the subsidiary reacts upon 
pressures (e.g. to conform or adapt) coming from these actors (Oliver, 1991) and 
determines how it coordinates its relationships (Grandori, 1997). Relations 
characterized by ‘dyadic dependence’, or interdependence are stronger and demand 
more intensive communication for organizing the complexities of the two-way flows 
of resources than relations in which one organization depends on another. Below, I 
will consecutively investigate the subsidiary's (inter-)dependence upon internal (MNC 
headquarters and sister subsidiaries) and external (local business partners, local 
government and non-government) actors and formulate propositions on the 
consequences for the strength and importance of this relationship to the focal 
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subsidiary and how this is likely to change over time as the subsidiary evolves. In 
order to develop a dynamic model of relationship management in subsidiaries, I 
should start to describe the process through which subsidiaries evolve. 
 
MNC subsidiary evolution 
Prior studies have described the evolution of subsidiary roles as a path 
dependent process of developing and accumulating resources and capabilities that 
define the subsidiary’s contribution to the MNC as a whole (Birkinshaw, 1996; 
Malnight, 1995). Malnight (1995) describes the globalization process within Eli Lilly 
and the expanding roles of subsidiaries up to a stage of leveraging specialized 
resources and capabilities to the benefit of the MNC as a whole. He observed a 
gradual expansion of subsidiaries’ activities and a selection of tasks in which 
specialization occurred that determined the later development of each subsidiary’s 
specific resources and capabilities. Birkinshaw (1996) investigates how subsidiary 
mandates, that is, a subsidiary’s specific activities for which it has a border crossing 
responsibility, are gained and lost. He describes the processes of mandate gain, 
development and loss as consecutive stages of a mandate life cycle, driven by the 
process of capability development. In this paper I understand the evolution of the 
subsidiary from its start, so from the moment it starts to accumulate and develop 
resources and capabilities, as a life cycle following the stages of birth, growth, and 
maturity, followed by revival and/ or decline (cf. Miller and Friesen, 1984). The 
authors referred to above have focused on subsidiary role change, and therefore on the 
latter two or three stages in subsidiary evolution from a life cycle perspective. In 
contrast, I concentrate on the first three stages: birth or start-up, growth and maturity 
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(for reviews of life cycle models at organizational and sub-unit level, see for instance 
Miller and Friesen, 1984, and Quinn and Cameron, 1983).  
In its early existence, in the start-up stage, newly established subsidiaries 
should aim to become viable entities, embedded in their environment. They start to 
build resources and capabilities that allow them to perform their activities in the local 
environment and survive. These resources and capabilities offer the subsidiary a 
necessary platform on which to build later on, but they are not sufficient to achieve a 
sustainable competitive advantage. In the growth stage subsidiaries start to define and 
build those resources and capabilities that will lead to a competitive advantage both in 
their local environment as well as in the MNC. In this stage subsidiaries will have to 
learn how they can combine their MNC-derived resources and capabilities with those 
tapped locally in such a unique way that they develop a sustainable competitive 
advantage. Subsidiaries that succeed in achieving this uniqueness and the competitive 
advantage reach the stage of maturity, in which they will need to maintain their 
position. Mature subsidiaries will have to stay alert therefore, and shift or revive their 
mandate(s) as described by Birkinshaw (1996), Malnight (1995) and others, because 
external or internal forces demand change or entrepreneurial initiatives within the 
subsidiary offer new opportunities (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). A visual 
representation of the life cycle stages in subsidiary evolution is provided in figure 2.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The evolution as described above and as represented in Figure 2 is particularly 
valid for generic expansions, i.e. for greenfield subsidiaries, which need to build up 
their resources and capabilities from scratch and less so for acquired subsidiaries that 
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can be assumed to already possess qualified and possibly unique resources, including 
network linkages to local market and non-market actors. It is therefore that I focus on 
understanding the dynamics of network relations of greenfield subsidiaries of MNCs. 
In the sections that follow, I will develop propositions on the shifting importance and 
strength of relationships regarding consequently hierarchical and lateral relations 
within the MNC, and market, government and non-government relations in the 
external (local) environment of subsidiaries. 
 
 
Relations within the MNC 
Hierarchical relations 
The strategic decision to establish a subsidiary in a particular host market is 
taken by the parent company. Therefore naturally, in its start-up stage, the subsidiary 
is highly dependent upon the financial resources, technical and managerial support 
provided by the parent company. It further needs the support of the parent in 
developing local relationships with business and government actors (Ghauri, 1990). 
Over time however, as the subsidiary becomes a viable entity and grows towards the 
mature stage by accumulating resources and enhancing capabilities, its dependence on 
(resources of) MNC headquarters decreases and it increasingly controls its own 
actions (Ghauri, 1990). Mature subsidiaries, which have achieved uniqueness in their 
contribution to the MNC develop their strategy more autonomously and plan their 
opportunities for growth, also beyond the borders of their host market (Birkinshaw 
and Hood, 1998; Forsgren, Holm and Johanson, 1992). Empirical research on 
headquarter-subsidiary relationships shows that centralized control mechanisms 
(which can be understood as reflecting headquarters’ involvement in subsidiary 
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activities) are used only for subsidiaries with low levels of resources (Ghoshal and 
Nohria, 1989) and that strategic control by headquarters declines with the increasing 
strategic importance of the subsidiary (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995). Not only 
does the subsidiary ‘s dependence on headquarters’ financial, institutional and 
knowledge resources decline with the accumulation of its own resources and 
capabilities, too much dependence on the core resources and capabilities of the MNC 
as accumulated in the headquarters could in fact even limit the subsidiary to build 
uniqueness in the growth stage. Opportunities for innovation and for developing 
unique resources and capabilities more likely reside in any other group of actors with 
which the subsidiary interacts (Phene and Almeida, 2003).  
As the subsidiary’s dependence declines and access to critical resources and 
capabilities from headquarters becomes less prominent in the process of subsidiary 
evolution when it moves from the start-up stage to the growth stage, it is less 
important for the subsidiary to maintain the same strength of relationship with 
headquarters as in the starting stage. This decline is relative, however, and should not 
fall below a certain level since subsidiaries drifting away from the MNC’s core 
resources and capabilities risk divestment or closure (Birkinshaw, 1996). During and 
also beyond the growth stage, subsidiaries will continue to use resources coming from 
headquarters, including strategy, products, technology, knowledge and other resources 
(Malnight, 1995; Phene and Almeida, 2003). 
 When the subsidiary evolves further into the mature stage in which it has 
developed its unique resources and capabilities and it contributes to the MNC as a 
whole, a situation of interdependence develops. The subsidiary is dependent upon 
headquarters’ resources, though less than in the start-up stage, as reasoned above, but 
likewise headquarters becomes dependent upon the focal subsidiary’s critical 
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contribution. In order to facilitate the increasing exchanges of resources it is important 
to develop a stronger relationship in this stage of subsidiary evolution. 
Formally, I propose, 
 
P1: Over time, as MNC subsidiaries evolve from the start-up stage to the growth 
stage, and to the maturity stage, the relative importance and strength of the relation 
to the MNC headquarters first declines with decreasing subsidiary dependence, then 




In modern MNCs, flows of resources are not restricted to vertical flows. In fact, the 
ability to exchange resources among subsidiaries through horizontal linkages is one of 
the MNC’s strategic advantages. A newly established subsidiary will primarily 
depend, but at a decreasing rate, upon the resources and support of headquarters, as 
reasoned above. In the start-up stage the subsidiary will become part of the MNC 
network and will most likely source products, technology, and knowledge that it 
needs for its local activities and for building viability, from other subsidiaries in the 
MNC. In this stage the newly established subsidiary faces high pressures to imitate 
their sisters’ production or logistics processes or comply with certain MNC-wide 
technical standards. When the subsidiary enters the growth stage it will start to 
develop its own unique resources and capabilities by combining the specialized 
resources of sister subsidiaries to which it has access with the particular resources and 
capabilities present in the local environment of the focal subsidiary (to which we turn 
in the next sections). In this stage, the subsidiary is highly dependent upon its lateral 
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relationships, because it needs the critical input of certain specialized sister 
subsidiaries in developing its own contribution both internally as well as externally in 
the local environment. It is likely to find a more diverse collection of resources 
through their lateral relations than through relations with MNC headquarters alone, 
because mature sister subsidiaries within the MNC system have already developed 
specialized resources and capabilities that are not available at headquarters.  
In the maturity stage, when the focal subsidiary has in fact developed its own 
unique resources with which it may contribute to its sister subsidiaries, resource flows 
will also go from the focal subsidiary to its sister subsidiaries, turning a relationship 
of dependence into interdepence (Hedlund, 1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; 
Malnight, 1995). For a focal subsidiary and its network relations with sister 
subsidiaries, therefore, the increased interdependence and likewise increased intensity 
of resource flows, imply a further increase in strength and importance of these 
relations to the focal subsidiary. 
  
P2: Over time, as MNC subsidiaries evolve from the start-up stage to the growth 
stage, and to the maturity stage, the importance and strength of their lateral relations 




Relations with external actors 
External business relations  
In developing its business successfully and building resources and capabilities, the 
MNC subsidiary is not only dependent upon its relations within the company, but also 
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on relations with its external network consisting of market and non-market actors. In 
the start-up stage, subsidiaries have to build relationships with market actors like local 
suppliers, sub-contractors, distributors and customers, in order to start their activities, 
and to learn how to do business in this market, where to find information, how to 
interpret it and in order to create future business opportunities and achieve legitimicay 
in the local market (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). 
New subsidiaries may discover that they have to comply with pressures from the local 
environment, for instance to adapt products or production processes to fit cooperation 
with local suppliers or distributors. Adapting certain processes and developing long-
term relationships with these local market actors will increase chances of survival 
(Andersson et al, 2002). Over time, the subsidiary accumulates experiential 
knowledge on how to operate in the local market and its dependence on local market 
actors in this respect declines (Ghauri, 1990; Zaheer, 1995). However, with respect to 
developing resources and capabilities and exploiting business opportunities its 
dependence on local market actors does not decline as the subsidiary matures. On the 
contrary, in the growth stage subsidiaries are highly dependent upon local market 
actors for developing their uniqueness in combining resources and capabilities that 
derive from the MNC linkages with those accessed in the local environment (Kogut 
and Zander, 1992; Andersson et al, 2001; Phene and Almeida, 2003). As the 
subsidiary succeeds in developing unique resources and capabilities and enters the 
maturity stage its dependence upon external market sources develops into 
interdependent relationships between the focal subsidiary and the external market 
actors, because it will be able to critically contribute to these external actors 
(Almeida, 1996) as well as to sister subsidiaries in the MNC as we have reasoned 
above. Further development of resources and capabilities in this and later stages is 
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likely to happen in close interaction and with much exchange of resources between a 
focal subsidiary and business network actors (Blankenburg-Holm et al., 1999). 
Though Nooteboom (1999) argues that learning from external sources primarily 
happens in the early stages of capability development of MNC subsidiaries followed 
by a period of exploiting acquired resources and capabilities, I hold, however, that 
interdependent relationships will result from the interaction with local market actors 
developing (in the growth stage) and continuously maintaining (in the maturity stage) 
uniqueness of the focal subsidiary’s resources and capabilities. Ghauri (1990) further 
asserts that local business network relations are most important to the survival of 
subsidiaries in a mature stage of internationalization. This is empirically supported by 
Oliver’s (2001) findings that a lack of network relationships is associated with firm 
exit or closure. Therefore, I expect MNC subsidiaries to continuously strengthen their 
relations with local market actors.  
 
P3: Over time, as MNC subsidiaries evolve from the start-up stage to the growth 
stage, and to the maturity stage, the importance and strength of their lateral relations 
with local business actors increases, because of increasing resource dependence, 
later interdependence of subsidiaries. 
 
  
Local government relations 
In their external environment, subsidiaries also meet non-market actors that 
define the social, political and legal boundaries of the firm’s activities (cf. Scott, 
1995) and in relation to which a subsidiary needs to develop its strategy (Baron, 
1995). Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) define the legal and regulatory constraints as 
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being “among the strongest […] environmental pressures faced by subsidiaries”.  
Acting within the boundaries set by local government is important for achieving 
legitimacy, but also affects the subsidiary’s performance and future business 
opportunities through the direct influence that regulations have on its profits and the 
activities performed locally. Before the subsidiary is established and enters the start-
up stage as defined in this paper, the MNC has already put many efforts in negotiating 
market entry (e.g. Lecraw, 1984) and has started the development of the subsidiary’s 
relationship with government. In the start-up stage in particular, the subsidiary 
therefore needs to develop (its own) relations with local regulatory bodies in order to 
be able to understand, correctly interpret and follow developments and changes of 
rules and laws that concern their activities. Furthermore, building embedded relations 
with local regulatory bodies may solve institutional barriers. Subsidiaries may for 
example be able to negotiate preferential treatment in providing access to resources or 
lowering costs through close relations with government actors (Oliver, 1996). Though 
building legitimacy and opening business opportunities through relations with 
government actors seem specifically important in the start-up stage, these relations 
should not be neglected in later stages of the life cycle (Jawahar and McLaughlin, 
2001; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999).  
Furthermore, in the context of MNC subsidiaries located in diverse foreign 
markets, we should consider the impact that differences in these local environments 
may have on the relations of subsidiaries with government actors. The development of 
relations with government is likely to be influenced by the level of social and political 
stability or uncertainty in the host market of a focal subsidiary (Hillman and Kaim, 
1995; Murtha and Lenway, 1994). Observations on foreign investment in transition 
markets in Central and Eastern Europe and China for instance, which are 
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characterized by political and economic instability and large government influence, 
suggest that strong relations with local government officials is important for obtaining 
access to future business opportunities (Peng and Heath, 1996; Luo 2001). Luo (2001) 
shows how relations of subsidiary managers with government institutions in China 
over-time increased these subsidiaries’ opportunities in this market and facilitated 
further network building. Subsidiaries operating in markets where government 
influence is large are more dependent on governments for their survival throughout 
the stages of subsidiary evolution. In general, however, I expect subsidiaries’ local 
government network relations to be most critical for their survival in the start-up 
stage, but to be less critical, though not negligible later on. 
 
P4: Over time, as MNC subsidiaries evolve from the start-up stage to the growth 
stage, and to the maturity stage, the importance and strength of their relations with 
local government decreases, because of the decreased dependence on government 
actors for achieving legitimacy and access to business opportunities. Subsidiaries 
located in markets characterized by uncertainty, however, continue to depend on 
government and their relations with local government actors continue to be important 
and strong throughout life cycle stages.  
 
Other external relations 
Non-market actors in the environment of MNC subsidiaries not only include 
government and related regulatory bodies, but also other groups and actors with 
which the subsidiary does not exchange resources, but that do have an impact on its 
legitimacy, its activities and, in the extreme case on its survival. In the recent past, 
local and global public opinion groups or activitists have had a significant impact on 
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decisions and strategies of MNCs and their subsidiaries. Prominent examples are 
Monsanto’s withdrawal of exports of genetically engineered seeds through 
‘terminator technology’ after global protests from a diversity of action groups and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the severe disruption of Shell’s Nigerian 
operations because of community unrest as well as similar protests on a global scale 
linked to political and environmental issues. MNC subsidiaries, specifically when 
they are active in highly visible or otherwise vulnerable industries, have to build 
legitimacy in the eyes of a diversity of social interest groups and they face greater 
challenges in building and maintaining legitimacy than smaller or less visible 
organizations. Local public opinion, furthermore, is extra harsh in judging the 
operations of foreign subsidiaries as compared to their evaluation of the activities of 
domestic companies (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Baron (1995) argues that dealing 
with public opinion should be integrated in the expansion strategies of MNCs and 
their subsidiaries. As subsidiaries evolve and develop resources and capabilities they 
may gain size because they take up more diverse activities and responsibilities. They 
will therefore also become more visible and vulnerable to the critical judgment of 
public opinion and NGOs, especially if they are active in industries that are watched 
carefully for their environmental and social effects (like biotechnology, chemical 
industry, food and beverages, toys, textiles, etc). MNC subsidiaries, specifically in 
these vulnerable industries, should build relations with local and global non-
governmental actors as their dependence on being perceived legitimate by these actors 
increases. Following Kostova and Zaheer (1999) I expect that the subsidiary’s 
dependence increases as it evolves through the stages of the life cycle, particularly 
because of its growth in the process of accumulating resources and capabilities.  
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Non-government non-market actors, however, may also facilitate or mediate 
access to specific resources embedded in the environment of the subsidiary that are 
not directly accessible and they may as such create value and enhance resources and 
capabilities of organizations. Teegen (2003) shows how international NGOs facilitate 
exchange and mediate between private and public actors in bargaining the 
development of trade and investment rules as well as social and environmental 
improvement. Because of this mediation subsidiaries can become dependent upon 
NGOs, though it is not likely that this dependence grows as larges as that on actors 
who provide direct linkages to critical resources. Interdependent relationships may 
also evolve if NGOs and subsidiaries possess resources and capabilities that are 
critical to each other (Doh and Teegen, 2002), or when the combination of these 
resources and capabilities results in the development of uniqueness (cf. Kogut and 
Zander, 1992). Based on the above, I propose that the subsidiary’s relations to other 
than government non-market actors grow increasingly important when the subsidiary 
shifts from a start-up stage to a growth stage, up to a certain level and will only 
increase further in later stages if interdependent relationships develop in the maturity 
stage. 
 
P5: Over time, as MNC subsidiaries evolve from the start-up stage to the growth 
stage, the importance and strength of their relation to other external actors increases, 
because of an increasing dependence on legitimacy and (mediation for) access to 
resources, and increases only further when the subsidiary evolves to the maturity 




Discussion: balancing dependencies  
In this paper, I have analyzed the subsidiary’s dependence on the pressures of 
five different (groups of) network actors and developed propositions on the strength 
of the subsidiary’s relations with these actors as subsidiaries evolve through stages of 
start-up, growth and maturity in which they accumulate and develop their resources 
and capabilities and uniqueness of these. The changes in the importance and strength 
of these relations for the focal subsidiary are related to shifting dependence and 
interdependence on the different actors during a subsidiary’s evolution. Figure 3 
graphically summarizes the five propositions.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
This paper is the first to analyze the subsidiary’s (inter-)dependence on and 
relations to internal MNC counterparts, and external business as well as institutional 
actors in the local market environment, using three bodies of complementary 
literature. I have incorporated elements of institutional theory in reasoning that 
subsidiaries face isomorphic pressures from several actors both within the MNC as 
well as in the external environment (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). Institutionalists 
emphasize the need of MNC subsidiaries to conform to these multiple pressures from 
the institutions in their environment in order to survive (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Resource dependency theory complements this view (cf. 
Oliver, 1991) in its focus on the operational environment of a focal subsidiary and its 
dependence on critical resources from a complex environment. According to resource 
dependency theorists MNC subsidiaries should specifically and actively devote 
attention to the demands of those stakeholders that at some point control critical 
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resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). I introduced network theory to complete this 
view and explain the development of the subsidiary’s relations with internal and 
external network relations, whose resources the focal subsidiary can access beyond its 
own boundaries (Dyer and Singh, 1998). In line with the network approach I argue 
that as subsidiaries mature and build their own resources and capabilities, they 
develop stronger relationships with relevant stakeholders that are increasingly 
characterized by interdependence (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995; Ghauri, 1990), 
particularly when subsidiaries achieve uniqueness in their resources and capabilities. 
To summarize, the more crucially the subsidiary depends upon the respective actors 
and their resources in any form, the more likely the subsidiary is to comply with their 
demands (Oliver, 1991) and the stronger the relationship between a subsidiary and 
these actors (Levine and White, 1961). Furthermore, when relations are characterized 
by interdependence they are even more salient to the focal subsidiary and its 
relationships will therefore strengthen even more in situations of interdependence 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
This paper further contributes to the literature through taking a process 
perspective and analyzing the changing dependence of MNC subsidiaries and its 
effect on the strength of relationships with respective actors. I described the evolution 
of the subsidiary as a process of consecutive stages labeled start-up, growth, maturity, 
revival and decline and focused the analysis on the first three stages in which the 
subsidiary builds its resources and capabilities and develops its uniqueness. In the 
start-up stage, when the subsidiary is being established and develops resources and 
capabilities primarily in order to achieve viability, it is highly dependent upon the 
MNC headquarters’ resources and knowledge support, as well as local government’s 
authorization and legitimacy support. As the subsidiary develops its own resources 
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and capabilities and accumulates experiential knowledge and local legitimacy in the 
growth stage, its dependence on headquarters and on local government declines. In 
this stage the subsidiary gradually builds its relationships with sister subsidiaries and 
local market actors in order to expand its business opportunities. In the maturity stage, 
when the subsidiary has succeeded in developing unique resources and capabilities 
with which it is able to critically contribute to other actors’ value creation process, 
other actors become dependent on the focal subsidiary as well, resulting in a situation 
of interdependence. Interdependent relations will most likely develop between the 
focal subsidiary and sister subsidiaries within the MNC and with local market actors, 
with which the subsidiary exchanges much resources and information in further 
developing unique capabilities and enhancing value, but are not restricted to market 
actors only. The subsidiary also develops interdependent relationships with 
government and non-government actors, especially in the local market, though these 
relations are likely to be less strong than those with market actors, since less resource 
exchanges can be expected in these relationships. 
 
Suggestions for future research 
Future research could continue to develop the current process framework 
through analyzing how the subsidiary’s dependencies on different network actors are 
interrelated. For instance, the decreased dependence on the parent company is 
connected to the increasing lateral interdependence among subsidiaries for several 
resources, including finance, goods and knowledge. Maturing subsidiaries build 
stronger relations with their sister subsidiaries and these relations could become more 
important than relations with headquarters. Another example is the effect of sister 
subsidiaries’ dependence on the focal subsidiary’s resources (as the subsidiary 
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develops unique, specialized resources that are crucial to the process of value creation 
in the MNC as a whole) and its own dependence on relations with local market actors 
and non-market actors. If the critical resources that sister subsidiaries depend on result 
from the subsidiary’s presence in the local market and its relations with local business 
actors, and are embedded in locally developed processes and procedures, MNC 
subsidiaries are strongly pressed to adapt to these local processes, i.e. to conform to 
external isomorphic pressures in the local market. To leverage these critical resources 
to internal MNC actors demands a certain level of internal conformity with respect to 
the specific process as well. For other products or processes, however, the focal 
subsidiary may continue to depend on sister subsidiaries’ specialized resources, which 
demand a higher level of internal isomorphism and probably a lower level of external 
isomorphism in these exchange processes. Future research could investigate such 
differences between different business processes and procedures within single 
subsidiaries and the effects on the balance between internal and external dependencies 
and interdependencies and the strength of subsidiaries’ internal and external 
relationships. 
A related and fruitful way of inquiry would be to investigate in more detail 
how subsidiaries balance their strategic response to demands from network actors 
with conflicting demands. Both conceptual as well as empirical investigations on 
subsidiaries’ responses to comply with, challenge or resist demands from different 
institutional environments and network actors over time would complement the 
framework on strength and importance of relations as developed above. Important 
insights can be developed from investigating not only visible actions or reactions of 
subsidiaries to stakeholder demands, but also the arguments and underlying motives 
for those actions.  
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This paper concentrated on MNC subsidiaries and their internal and external 
relations and dependencies. Future studies could, finally, investigate the management 
of relations at higher organizational levels within large MNCs. For instance, we do 
not know yet how the dependencies of different MNC units on network actors in their 
local national environments interact, or how they interact with MNC’s dependence on 
regional or global actors as the EU, WTO or global public opinion. Further, this paper 
did not investigate how a subsidiary’s dependence on the MNC may be influenced by 
its participation in a global supplier or outsourcing contract. Another issue worth 
exploring on the headquarters versus subsidiary level issue, is at what point the 
responsibility to react to claims or demands from different groups of actors, including 
local government and non-government actors like public opinion groups shifts from 
the level of MNC headquarters to subsidiaries or vice versa. 
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Figure 1: The complexity of an MNC subsidiary’ s environment and its direct links to 
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Figure 2: Subsidiary evolution and the level of its unique resources and capabilities 




Start-up stage:  the 
subsidiary develops 
R&C necessary for 
survival 
Growth stage: the 
susbidiary defines and 
develops unique R&C 
necessary for building 
competitive advantage 
Stages of decline and revival: the subsidiary 
shifts its attention several times and likewise 
renews and adapts its R&Cs if successful; the 
dotted line shows the loss of unique R&Cs in 
unscuccessful subsidiaries (compare the 
mandate life cycle in Birkinshaw, 1996) 
Maturity stage: the subsidiary 
needs to maintain its 
competitive advantage by 
continuously developing its 
R&C  
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Figure 3: Strength of subsidiary relations with five groups of actors in the start-up 
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